The world’s attention has
been riveted in 2008, by election crises in Africa, first Kenya,
and now Zimbabwe. In both
cases, challenges remain in converting electoral victory to
political power. Can a victorious opposition come to power in
the face of an obstinate incumbent? This question is particularly
relevant when the incumbent regime controls the coercive apparatus
of the state and the opposition only has the ballot in its corner.
In the battle of the ballot vs. the bullet, can there ever be
a fair match?
Historically
the answer has been no. But new developments on the democratic
front in Africa in the last decade have strengthened election support and monitoring
by key regional bodies, the Southern African Development Community
(SADC) and the African Union (AU). In 2004, SADC adopted Principles
and Guidelines Governing Democratic Elections aimed
at “enhancing the transparency and credibility of elections
and democratic governance as well as ensuring the acceptance
of election results by contesting parties”. The African
Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance adopted
by the AU in 2007 to, among other things, “promote the holding
of regular free and fair elections to institutionalize legitimate
authority of representative government as well as democratic
change of government”, consolidated gains on the electoral front.
These developments have strengthened the electoral process on
the continent, creating the space for opposition parties to
compete fairly. At a minimum, international supervision through
these protocols compels sitting governments to desist from outright
repression and undemocratic practices.
Vibrant Civil Society
Another
significant development on the African continent is the emergence
of a vibrant independent civil society focused on democracy,
human rights and social justice. In fact, the SADC and AU protocols
would not count for much if not for civil society pressure on
African leaders to abide. In both the Zimbabwean and Kenyan
election crises, civil society played a key role in documenting,
exposing and transmitting human rights violations. In addition,
the advent of the Internet and other modern communication tools
shrinks time and space, making it possible to build instant
global people to people communication and solidarity links.
Consequently, incidents that would blow away unnoticed in the
past, now invoke global outrage.
Weak National Democratic Institutions
Both
the cases of Kenya
and Zimbabwe expose the weaknesses
of national democratic institutions, particularly those mandated
to oversee the conduct of elections. In Zimbabwe, the Zimbabwe Electoral Commission, like
its Kenyan counterpart was exposed as partisan in favor of the
incumbent regime. In both countries the judiciary was no recourse
as the judicial bench is routinely “staffed” by government loyalists.
A key challenge therefore is how to evolve robust democratic
institutions as a lasting foundation for an enduring democracy
and social stability. Key elements of a fully functioning democracy
are an independent and impartial electoral commission, an independent
judiciary, and a democratic constitution. 
Regrettably,
these conditions don’t always hold in countries emerging from
a colonial past.
Non-Partisan
security forces are also critical elements of a democratic state
where people choose their leaders freely. In Zimbabwe
the army, the police and secret services merged seamlessly with
the violent campaign machinery of the ruling Zimbabwe African
National Unity Patriotic Front (Zanu-PF). In Kenya,
the police stood in President Kibaki’s corner and brutally massacred
hundreds of opposition activists in protests that followed the
disputed election. The lessons of Kenya
and Zimbabwe underscore
the importance of professionalizing the army, police, prison
services, and secret services so that the security forces are
not party operatives. This is particularly daunting for countries
like Zimbabwe, where former liberation movements are
in power and their allied armed wings have been integrated into
national security forces. There tends to be partisan loyalty
amongst these “war veterans”, their allies, and affiliated parties.
International Intervention
Both
Zimbabwe
and Kenya raise the question
of the role of the international community in resolving internal
conflict. Clearly, in circumstances of weak democratic institutions,
a victorious opposition must rely on more than the ballot to
secure power. In the case of Kenya,
unlike Zimbabwe, the opposition
used mass mobilization and threats of total economic paralysis
to leverage its power and ultimately compel the sitting government
towards a negotiated settlement.
In
Kenya, the
U.S., Britain,
the AU and other players in the international community played
a key role in brokering the power-sharing deal that stopped
Kenya from plunging into the abyss of political
chaos. While the political settlement in Kenya succeeded in stopping violence, the key
question remains unanswered - how to ensure the unhindered transfer
of power to the true winners of the election. The deal currently
holding Kenya
together is an inferior solution that will only be meaningful
if immediate steps are taken to ensure that the will of the
people is respected in the next election.
International
mediation in Kenya was made easier as key players in the international
community had access to and leverage with both sides of the
crisis; and the local actors were not irreparably polarized.
This is a key difference with Zimbabwe, where political
polarization is acute and Western powers have no diplomatic
access to Mugabe. Mugabe’s response to Britain’s “school yard” isolationist diplomacy
has been to throw his toys and act like he just does not care.
The
role that the U.S.
can play in Zimbabwe
is undermined by the Bush Administration’s lack of international
credibility, partly because of the discredited Iraq
war; and outright hypocrisy where the U.S.
embraces favored dictators such as Ethiopia’s
Meles Zenawi and Pakistan’s
Musharraf while preaching democracy in Zimbabwe. These discrepancies make statements
about democracy in Zimbabwe
ring hollow and provoke questions about the real motives of
U.S. foreign policy.
SADC
and the AU, equipped with relatively new principles and protocols,
are limited in their actions by the poor human rights record
and electoral practices of many of the present leaders. The
precedent already set by failure to take a firm stance against
members such as Sudan
for gross human rights abuses and Ethiopia
and Nigeria
for outright electoral fraud, limits the extent of what African
leaders can do now. Mugabe is already exploiting this Achilles’
heel and effectively paralyzing the AU by arguing that others
have been allowed to get away with worse crimes. Thus, while
there is a growing voice of “concern” by African leaders, the
response falls far short of the moral outrage conditions on
the ground demand.
The
14-nation strong SADC is in the best position to influence developments
in Zimbabwe. The region
completely land locks Zimbabwe and as such wields a big economic muscle.
But more importantly, SADC does have a history of direct intervention
in trouble spots. In 1998 South
Africa and Botswana
sent troops to Lesotho
as part of a SADC mission to crush a coup and “restore democracy”
following controversial elections in that country. In 1997,
Mugabe, in a position then as SADC’s Chairman of the Organ on
Security and Defense, led Angola and Namibia in a military intervention in the Democratic
Republic of Congo.
The
key question is how to balance intervention by all the international
players - SADC, AU, UN and Western powers. The UN’s role is
tough, as its original mandate involved conflicts between
and not within nations. Western powers, particularly
the U.S.
and Britain,
have thrust themselves forward ahead of all the other players
in Zimbabwe in ways that are not always helpful given
the region’s colonial past and Western corporate interests.
Unilateral actions by Western countries often compromise the
position of democratic forces on the continent, as they face
accusations of being Western puppets. African leaders in a new
era of African renaissance do not want to appear to be taking
orders from the West. This is not to say that the West has no
role to play, international action must be directed through
existing African institutions and the UN.
In
countries like Zimbabwe
and Kenya, bolstering
African institutions and pressuring them to uphold their protocols
on human rights, elections and good governance is the best path
to democracy. 
A
true solution to the current political crises in Zimbabwe and elsewhere on the continent is strengthening
the ballot, and amplifying regional and continental peace making
through the AU and SADC.
For
additional news and analysis concerning social justice in Africa
visit Pambazuka
News (www.pambazuka.org).
BlackCommentator.com
Guest Commentator, Briggs Bomba, is Associate Director for Campaigns
at Africa Action. He is from
Zimbabwe. Click here
to contact Briggs Bomba.
