The
world’s attention has been riveted in 2008, by election crises in Africa,
first Kenya, and now
Zimbabwe. In both
cases, challenges remain in converting electoral victory to political
power. Can a victorious opposition come to power in the face of an obstinate
incumbent? This question is particularly relevant when the incumbent regime
controls the coercive apparatus of the state and the opposition only has
the ballot in its corner. In the battle of the ballot vs. the bullet,
can there ever be a fair match?
Historically
the answer has been no. But new developments on the democratic front in
Africa in the last decade have strengthened election support and monitoring
by key regional bodies, the Southern African Development Community (SADC)
and the African Union (AU). In 2004, SADC adopted Principles
and Guidelines Governing Democratic Elections aimed at “enhancing
the transparency and credibility of elections and democratic governance
as well as ensuring the acceptance of election results by contesting parties”.
The African
Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance adopted by the
AU in 2007 to, among other things, “promote the holding of regular free
and fair elections to institutionalize legitimate authority of representative
government as well as democratic change of government”, consolidated gains
on the electoral front. These developments have strengthened the electoral
process on the continent, creating the space for opposition parties to
compete fairly. At a minimum, international supervision through these
protocols compels sitting governments to desist from outright repression
and undemocratic practices.
Vibrant Civil Society
Another significant
development on the African continent is the emergence of a vibrant independent
civil society focused on democracy, human rights and social justice. In
fact, the SADC and AU protocols would not count for much if not for civil
society pressure on African leaders to abide. In both the Zimbabwean and
Kenyan election crises, civil society played a key role in documenting,
exposing and transmitting human rights violations. In addition, the advent
of the Internet and other modern communication tools shrinks time and
space, making it possible to build instant global people to people communication
and solidarity links. Consequently, incidents that would blow away unnoticed
in the past, now invoke global outrage.
Weak National Democratic Institutions
Both the cases
of Kenya and Zimbabwe expose the weaknesses
of national democratic institutions, particularly those mandated to oversee
the conduct of elections. In Zimbabwe, the Zimbabwe Electoral Commission, like
its Kenyan counterpart was exposed as partisan in favor of the incumbent
regime. In both countries the judiciary was no recourse as the judicial
bench is routinely “staffed” by government loyalists. A key challenge
therefore is how to evolve robust democratic institutions as a lasting
foundation for an enduring democracy and social stability. Key elements
of a fully functioning democracy are an independent and impartial electoral
commission, an independent judiciary, and a democratic constitution. Regrettably,
these conditions don’t always hold in countries emerging from a colonial
past.
Non-Partisan
security forces are also critical elements of a democratic state where
people choose their leaders freely. In Zimbabwe
the army, the police and secret services merged seamlessly with the violent
campaign machinery of the ruling Zimbabwe African National Unity Patriotic
Front (Zanu-PF). In Kenya,
the police stood in President Kibaki’s corner and brutally massacred hundreds
of opposition activists in protests that followed the disputed election.
The lessons of Kenya
and Zimbabwe underscore
the importance of professionalizing the army, police, prison services,
and secret services so that the security forces are not party operatives.
This is particularly daunting for countries like Zimbabwe, where former liberation movements are
in power and their allied armed wings have been integrated into national
security forces. There tends to be partisan loyalty amongst these “war
veterans”, their allies, and affiliated parties.
International Intervention
Both Zimbabwe
and Kenya raise the question
of the role of the international community in resolving internal conflict.
Clearly, in circumstances of weak democratic institutions, a victorious
opposition must rely on more than the ballot to secure power. In the case
of Kenya, unlike Zimbabwe, the opposition
used mass mobilization and threats of total economic paralysis to leverage
its power and ultimately compel the sitting government towards a negotiated
settlement.
In Kenya,
the U.S., Britain,
the AU and other players in the international community played a key role
in brokering the power-sharing deal that stopped Kenya from plunging into the abyss of political
chaos. While the political settlement in Kenya succeeded in stopping violence, the key
question remains unanswered - how to ensure the unhindered transfer of
power to the true winners of the election. The deal currently holding
Kenya
together is an inferior solution that will only be meaningful if immediate
steps are taken to ensure that the will of the people is respected in
the next election.
International
mediation in Kenya was made easier as key players in the international
community had access to and leverage with both sides of the crisis; and
the local actors were not irreparably polarized. This is a key difference
with Zimbabwe, where political
polarization is acute and Western powers have no diplomatic access to
Mugabe. Mugabe’s response to Britain’s “school yard” isolationist diplomacy
has been to throw his toys and act like he just does not care.
The role that
the U.S. can play in
Zimbabwe is undermined
by the Bush Administration’s lack of international credibility, partly
because of the discredited Iraq
war; and outright hypocrisy where the U.S.
embraces favored dictators such as Ethiopia’s
Meles Zenawi and Pakistan’s
Musharraf while preaching democracy in Zimbabwe. These discrepancies make statements
about democracy in Zimbabwe
ring hollow and provoke questions about the real motives of U.S. foreign policy.
SADC and the
AU, equipped with relatively new principles and protocols, are limited
in their actions by the poor human rights record and electoral practices
of many of the present leaders. The precedent already set by failure to
take a firm stance against members such as Sudan
for gross human rights abuses and Ethiopia
and Nigeria
for outright electoral fraud, limits the extent of what African leaders
can do now. Mugabe is already exploiting this Achilles’ heel and effectively
paralyzing the AU by arguing that others have been allowed to get away
with worse crimes. Thus, while there is a growing voice of “concern” by
African leaders, the response falls far short of the moral outrage conditions
on the ground demand.
The 14-nation
strong SADC is in the best position to influence developments in Zimbabwe. The region
completely land locks Zimbabwe and as such wields a big economic muscle.
But more importantly, SADC does have a history of direct intervention
in trouble spots. In 1998 South Africa
and Botswana sent troops
to Lesotho
as part of a SADC mission to crush a coup and “restore democracy” following
controversial elections in that country. In 1997, Mugabe, in a position
then as SADC’s Chairman of the Organ on Security and Defense, led Angola and Namibia in a military intervention in the Democratic
Republic of Congo.
The key question
is how to balance intervention by all the international players - SADC,
AU, UN and Western powers. The UN’s role is tough, as its original mandate
involved conflicts between and not within nations. Western
powers, particularly the U.S.
and Britain, have thrust
themselves forward ahead of all the other players in Zimbabwe in ways that are not always helpful given
the region’s colonial past and Western corporate interests. Unilateral
actions by Western countries often compromise the position of democratic
forces on the continent, as they face accusations of being Western puppets.
African leaders in a new era of African renaissance do not want to appear
to be taking orders from the West. This is not to say that the West has
no role to play, international action must be directed through existing
African institutions and the UN.
In countries
like Zimbabwe and Kenya, bolstering
African institutions and pressuring them to uphold their protocols on
human rights, elections and good governance is the best path to democracy.
A true solution to the current political crises in Zimbabwe and elsewhere on the continent is strengthening
the ballot, and amplifying regional and continental peace making through
the AU and SADC.
For additional
news and analysis concerning social justice in Africa visit Pambazuka
News (www.pambazuka.org).
BlackCommentator.com
Guest Commentator, Briggs Bomba, is Associate Director for Campaigns at
Africa Action. He is from
Zimbabwe. Click here
to contact Briggs Bomba.
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