A thick fence, surveillance cameras, and armed
guards protect the U.S. Embassy in La
Paz. The embassy is a tall, white building with narrow slits
of windows that make it look like a military bunker. After
passing through a security checkpoint, I sit down with U.S.
Embassy spokesman Eric Watnik and ask if the embassy is working
against the socialist government of Evo Morales. “Our cooperation
in Bolivia is apolitical, transparent, and given
directly to assist in the development of the country,” Watnik
tells me. “It is given to benefit those who need it most.”
From the Bush Administration’s perspective,
that turns out to mean Morales’s opponents. Declassified documents
and interviews on the ground in Bolivia
prove that the Bush Administration is using U.S.
taxpayers’ money to undermine the Morales government and co-opt
the country’s dynamic social movements - just as it has tried
to do recently in Venezuela and traditionally throughout Latin America.
Much of that money is going through the U.S.
Agency for International Development (USAID). In July 2002,
a declassified message from the U.S. embassy in Bolivia to
Washington included the following message: “A planned USAID
political party reform project aims at implementing an existing
Bolivian law that would...over the long run, help build moderate,
pro-democracy political parties that can serve as a counterweight
to the radical MAS or its successors.” MAS refers to Morales’s
party, which, in English, stands for Movement Toward Socialism.
Morales won the presidency in December 2005
with 54 percent of the vote, but five regional governments
went to rightwing politicians. After Morales’s victory, USAID,
through its Office of Transition Initiatives, decided “to
provide support to fledgling regional governments,” USAID
documents reveal.
Throughout 2006, four of these five resource-rich
lowland departments pushed for greater autonomy from the Morales-led
central government, often threatening to secede from the nation.
U.S. funds have emboldened them, with the Office
of Transition Initiatives funneling “116 grants for $4,451,249
to help departmental governments operate more strategically,”
the documents state.
“USAID helps with the process of decentralization,”
says Jose Carvallo, a press spokesperson for the main rightwing
opposition political party, Democratic and Social Power. “They
help with improving democracy in Bolivia
through seminars and courses to discuss issues of autonomy.”
“The U.S. Embassy is helping this opposition,”
agrees Raul Prada, who works for Morales’s party. Prada is
sitting down in a crowded La
Paz cafe and eating ice cream. His upper lip is black and
blue from a beating he received at the hands of Morales’s
opponents while Prada was working on the new constitutional
assembly. “The ice cream is to lessen the swelling,” he explains.
The Morales government organized this constitutional assembly
to redistribute wealth from natural resources and guarantee
broader access to education, land, water, gas, electricity,
and health care for the country’s poor majority. I had seen
Prada in the early days of the Morales administration. He
was wearing an indigenous wiphala flag pin and happily chewing
coca leaves in his government office. This time, he wasn’t
as hopeful. He took another scoop of ice cream and continued:
“USAID is in Santa
Cruz and other departments to help fund and strengthen the
infrastructure of the rightwing governors.”
In
August 2007, Morales told a diplomatic gathering in La Paz, “I cannot understand how some ambassadors
dedicate themselves to politics, and not diplomacy, in our
country…That is not called cooperation. That is called conspiracy.”
Bolivian Vice President Alvaro Garcia Linera said that the
U.S. Embassy was funding the government’s political opponents
in an effort to develop “ideological and political resistance.”
One example is USAID’s financing of Juan Carlos Urenda, an
adviser to the rightwing Civic Committee, and author of the
Autonomy Statute, a plan for Santa Cruz’s
secession from Bolivia.
“There is absolutely no truth to any allegation
that the U.S. is using its aid funds to try and influence
the political process or in any way undermine the government,”
says State Department deputy spokesman Tom Casey. USAID officials
point out that this support has gone to all Bolivian governors,
not just those in the opposition. Despite Casey’s assertion,
this funding has been controversial. On October 10, Bolivia’s
supreme court approved a decree that prohibits international
funding of activities in Bolivia without state regulation. One article
in the law explains that Bolivia will not accept money with political or
ideological strings attached.
In Bolivia,
where much of the political muscle is in the streets with
social organizations and unions, it’s not enough for Washington
to work only at levels of high political power. They have
to reach the grassroots as well. One USAID official told me
by e-mail that the Office of Transition Initiatives “launched
its Bolivia program to help reduce tensions in areas
prone to social conflict (in particular El Alto) and to assist
the country in preparing for upcoming electoral events.”
To find out how this played out on the ground,
I meet with El Alto-based journalist Julio Mamani in the Regional
Workers’ Center in his city, which neighbors La Paz.
“There was a lot of rebellious ideology and
organizational power in El Alto in 2003,” Mamani explains,
referring to the populist uprising that overthrew President
Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada. “So USAID strengthened its presence
in El Alto, and focused their funding and programs on developing
youth leadership. Their style of leadership was not based
on the radical demands of the city or the horizontal leadership
styles of the unions. They wanted to push these new leaders
away from the city’s unions and into hierarchical government
positions.”
The USAID programs demobilized the youth. “USAID
always took advantage of the poverty of the people,” Mamani
says. “They even put up USAID flags in areas alongside the
Bolivian flag and the wiphala.”
It
was not hard to find other stories of what the U.S. government had been doing to influence economics
and politics in Bolivia.
Luis Gonzalez, an economics student at the University
of San Simon in Cochabamba, describes a panel he went to in 2006 that was organized
by the Millennium Foundation. That year, this foundation received
$155,738 from the National Endowment for Democracy (NED) through
the Center for International Private Enterprise, a nonprofit
affiliate of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce. Gonzalez, in glasses
and a dark ponytail, described a panel that focused on criticizing
state control of the gas industry (a major demand of social
movements). “The panelists said that foreign investment and
production in Bolivia will diminish if the
gas remains under partial state control,” says Gonzalez. “They
advocated privatization, corporate control, and pushed neo-liberal
policies.”
That same year, the NED funded another $110,134
to groups in Bolivia
through the Center for International Private Enterprise to,
according to NED documents, “provide information about the
effects of proposed economic reforms to decision-makers involved
in the Constituent Assembly.” According to documents obtained
through a Freedom of Information Act request by muckraker
Jeremy Bigwood, the NED also funded programs that brought
thirteen young “emerging leaders” from Bolivia
to Washington between
2002 and 2004 to strengthen their rightwing political parties.
The MAS, and other leftist parties, were not invited to these
meetings.
The U.S. Embassy even appears to be using Fulbright
scholars in its effort to undermine the Bolivian government.
One Fulbright scholar in Bolivia, who wished to remain anonymous, explained
that during recent orientation meetings at the embassy in
La Paz, “a member of the U.S. Embassy’s security
apparatus requested reports back to the embassy with detailed
information if we should encounter any Venezuelans or Cubans
in the field.” Both Venezuela
and Cuba provide funding, doctors,
and expertise to support their socialist ally Morales. The
student adds that the embassy’s request “contradicts the Fulbright
program’s guidelines, which prohibit us from interfering in
politics or doing anything that would offend the host country.”
After finding out about the negative work the
U.S. government was doing in Bolivia, I was curious to
see one of the positive projects USAID officials touted so
often. It took more than two weeks for them to get back to
me - plenty of time, I thought, to choose the picture perfect
example of their “apolitical” and development work organized
“to benefit those who need it most.”
They put me in touch with Wilma Rocha, the
boss at a clothing factory in El Alto called Club de Madres
Nueva Esperanza (Mothers’ Club of New Hope). A USAID consultant
worked in the factory in 2005-2006, offering advice on management
issues and facilitating the export of the business’s clothing
to U.S. markets. In a city of
well-organized, working class radicals, Rocha is one of the
few right-wingers. She is a fierce critic of the Morales administration
and the El Alto unions and neighborhood councils.
Ten female employees are knitting at a table
in the corner of a vast pink factory room full of dozens of
empty sewing machines. “For three months we’ve barely had
any work at all,” one of the women explains while Rocha waits
at a distance. “When we do get paychecks, the pay is horrible.”
I ask for her name, but she says she can’t give it to me.
“If the boss finds out we are being critical, she’ll beat
us.”
Benjamin Dangl is the author of The
Price of Fire: Resource Wars And Social Movements in Bolivia.
He received a 2007 Project Censored Award for his coverage
of U.S. military operations in Paraguay. This commentary
originally appeared in The Progressive (http://www.progressive.org).
Click
here to contact Mr. Dangl.