A thick fence, surveillance cameras, and armed guards protect the U.S.
Embassy in La Paz. The embassy
is a tall, white building with narrow slits of windows that make it
look like a military bunker. After passing through a security checkpoint,
I sit down with U.S. Embassy spokesman Eric Watnik
and ask if the embassy is working against the socialist government of
Evo Morales. “Our cooperation in Bolivia is apolitical, transparent, and given
directly to assist in the development of the country,” Watnik tells me. “It is given to benefit those who need it
most.”
From the Bush Administration’s perspective, that turns out to mean
Morales’s opponents. Declassified documents and interviews on the ground
in Bolivia prove
that the Bush Administration is using U.S.
taxpayers’ money to undermine the Morales government and co-opt the
country’s dynamic social movements - just as it has tried to do recently
in Venezuela and traditionally throughout Latin America.
Much of that money is going through the U.S. Agency for International
Development (USAID). In July 2002, a declassified message from the U.S.
embassy in Bolivia to Washington included the following message: “A
planned USAID political party reform project aims at implementing an
existing Bolivian law that would...over the long run, help build moderate,
pro-democracy political parties that can serve as a counterweight to
the radical MAS or its successors.” MAS refers
to Morales’s party, which, in English, stands for Movement Toward Socialism.
Morales won the presidency in December 2005 with 54 percent of the
vote, but five regional governments went to rightwing politicians. After
Morales’s victory, USAID, through its Office of Transition Initiatives,
decided “to provide support to fledgling regional governments,” USAID
documents reveal.
Throughout 2006, four of these five resource-rich lowland departments
pushed for greater autonomy from the Morales-led central government,
often threatening to secede from the nation. U.S. funds have emboldened them, with the Office
of Transition Initiatives funneling “116 grants for $4,451,249 to help
departmental governments operate more strategically,” the documents
state.
“USAID helps with the process of decentralization,” says Jose Carvallo,
a press spokesperson for the main rightwing opposition political party,
Democratic and Social Power. “They help with improving democracy in
Bolivia
through seminars and courses to discuss issues of autonomy.”
“The U.S. Embassy is helping this opposition,” agrees Raul Prada, who works for Morales’s party. Prada
is sitting down in a crowded La
Paz cafe and eating ice cream. His upper lip is black and blue from
a beating he received at the hands of Morales’s opponents while Prada
was working on the new constitutional assembly. “The ice cream is to
lessen the swelling,” he explains. The Morales government organized
this constitutional assembly to redistribute wealth from natural resources
and guarantee broader access to education, land, water, gas, electricity,
and health care for the country’s poor majority. I had seen Prada
in the early days of the Morales administration. He was wearing an indigenous
wiphala flag pin and happily chewing coca leaves in his government
office. This time, he wasn’t as hopeful. He took another scoop of ice
cream and continued: “USAID is in Santa
Cruz and other departments to help fund and strengthen the infrastructure
of the rightwing governors.”
In August 2007, Morales told a diplomatic gathering in La Paz, “I cannot understand how some ambassadors
dedicate themselves to politics, and not diplomacy, in our country…That
is not called cooperation. That is called conspiracy.” Bolivian Vice
President Alvaro Garcia Linera said that the
U.S. Embassy was funding the government’s political opponents in an
effort to develop “ideological and political resistance.” One example
is USAID’s financing of Juan Carlos Urenda,
an adviser to the rightwing Civic Committee, and author of the Autonomy
Statute, a plan for Santa Cruz’s secession from
Bolivia.
“There is absolutely no truth to any allegation that the U.S. is using
its aid funds to try and influence the political process or in any way
undermine the government,” says State Department deputy spokesman Tom
Casey. USAID officials point out that this support has gone to all Bolivian
governors, not just those in the opposition. Despite Casey’s assertion,
this funding has been controversial. On October 10, Bolivia’s
supreme court approved a decree that prohibits
international funding of activities in Bolivia without state regulation. One article
in the law explains that Bolivia will not accept money with political or
ideological strings attached.
In Bolivia, where
much of the political muscle is in the streets with social organizations
and unions, it’s not enough for Washington
to work only at levels of high political power. They have to reach the
grassroots as well. One USAID official told me by e-mail that the Office
of Transition Initiatives “launched its Bolivia program to help reduce tensions in areas
prone to social conflict (in particular El Alto) and to assist the country
in preparing for upcoming electoral events.”
To find out how this played out on the ground, I meet with El Alto-based
journalist Julio Mamani in the Regional Workers’
Center in his city, which neighbors La Paz.
“There was a lot of rebellious ideology and organizational power in
El Alto in 2003,” Mamani explains, referring
to the populist uprising that overthrew President Gonzalo Sánchez
de Lozada. “So USAID strengthened its presence
in El Alto, and focused their funding and programs on developing youth
leadership. Their style of leadership was not based on the radical demands
of the city or the horizontal leadership styles of the unions. They
wanted to push these new leaders away from the city’s unions and into
hierarchical government positions.”
The USAID programs demobilized the youth. “USAID always took advantage
of the poverty of the people,” Mamani says.
“They even put up USAID flags in areas alongside the Bolivian flag and
the wiphala.”
It was not hard to find other stories of what the U.S. government had been doing to influence economics
and politics in Bolivia.
Luis Gonzalez, an economics student at the University
of San Simon in Cochabamba, describes a panel he went to
in 2006 that was organized by the Millennium Foundation. That year,
this foundation received $155,738 from the National Endowment for Democracy
(NED) through the Center for International Private Enterprise, a nonprofit
affiliate of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce. Gonzalez, in glasses and
a dark ponytail, described a panel that focused on criticizing state
control of the gas industry (a major demand of social movements). “The
panelists said that foreign investment and production in Bolivia will diminish if the
gas remains under partial state control,” says Gonzalez. “They advocated
privatization, corporate control, and pushed neo-liberal
policies.”
That same year, the NED funded another $110,134 to groups in Bolivia
through the Center for International Private Enterprise to, according
to NED documents, “provide information about the effects of proposed
economic reforms to decision-makers involved in the Constituent Assembly.”
According to documents obtained through a Freedom of Information Act
request by muckraker Jeremy Bigwood, the NED
also funded programs that brought thirteen young “emerging leaders”
from Bolivia to Washington
between 2002 and 2004 to strengthen their rightwing political parties.
The MAS, and other leftist parties, were not invited to these meetings.
The U.S. Embassy even appears to be using Fulbright scholars in its
effort to undermine the Bolivian government. One Fulbright scholar in
Bolivia, who wished to remain anonymous, explained
that during recent orientation meetings at the embassy in La Paz, “a member of the U.S. Embassy’s security
apparatus requested reports back to the embassy with detailed information
if we should encounter any Venezuelans or Cubans in the field.” Both
Venezuela and Cuba provide funding, doctors,
and expertise to support their socialist ally Morales. The student adds
that the embassy’s request “contradicts the Fulbright program’s guidelines,
which prohibit us from interfering in politics or doing anything that
would offend the host country.”
After finding out about the negative work the U.S. government was doing in Bolivia, I was curious to
see one of the positive projects USAID officials touted so often. It
took more than two weeks for them to get back to me - plenty of time,
I thought, to choose the picture perfect example of their “apolitical”
and development work organized “to benefit those who need it most.”
They put me in touch with Wilma Rocha, the
boss at a clothing factory in El Alto called Club de Madres Nueva Esperanza (Mothers’ Club of New Hope). A USAID consultant
worked in the factory in 2005-2006, offering advice on management issues
and facilitating the export of the business’s clothing to U.S. markets. In a city of
well-organized, working class radicals, Rocha is one of the few right-wingers. She is a fierce critic of the Morales administration
and the El Alto unions and neighborhood councils.
Ten female employees are knitting at a table in the corner of a vast
pink factory room full of dozens of empty sewing machines. “For three
months we’ve barely had any work at all,” one of the women explains
while Rocha waits at a distance. “When we do get paychecks, the pay
is horrible.” I ask for her name, but she says she can’t give it to
me. “If the boss finds out we are being critical, she’ll beat us.”
Benjamin Dangl is the author of The
Price of Fire: Resource Wars And Social Movements in Bolivia.
He received a 2007 Project Censored Award for his coverage of U.S. military operations in Paraguay. This commentary
originally appeared in The Progressive (http://www.progressive.org).
Click
here to contact Mr. Dangl.