|
A friend recently told me how
a relative of theirs was most concerned about developments in Egypt, given
the dominance of the right-wing Islamist Muslim Brotherhood. I have heard
similar such concerns raised, as conservative Islamists have come to play major
roles in post-uprising governments, e.g., Tunisia,
Egypt.
In some cases, there is an implication in such concerns that it might have been
better to have left things as they were with authoritarian regimes in place to
block the Islamists.
The Arab democratic uprisings
were world-historic, yet their outcome remains uncertain. It is premature to
conclude that the rise of the Islamists is necessarily a permanent feature of
the politics of these countries. There are, however, certain points to note as
we reflect on the results of these uprisings and the road forward.
First, it is fair to say that
the so-called Arab Spring represented an accumulation of
anti-authoritarian/anti-neo-liberal uprisings. They were not revolutions in the
sense of fundamental socio-economic change, but they were popular uprisings
that brought down or challenged tyrannical regimes, regimes that had either
been client states of the West or, in the case of Syria
and Libya,
held a more ambiguous international role. In that sense, these uprisings set
the stage for the possibilities of something deeper and more long-lasting.
Second, while Tunisia and Egypt
carried out largely non-violent uprisings that were successful in bringing down
tyrannies, the movement in Bahrain,
though quite massive, was successfully divided by the regime using Sunni/Shiite
contradictions along with vicious repression. This repression, by the way, was
actively supported by Saudi Arabia
and the complicity of the USA.
In Yemen, the movement stalled and, with the activism of the Al Qaeda
affiliate, was not only divided, but disorganized and ignored by the West
(except, of course, for the continuous US drone assaults against alleged Al
Qaeda targets). In Libya and
Syria,
as we know, the largely peaceful movements evolved into violent uprisings in
the face of active repression by the governments. In the case of Libya, the peaceful uprising was hijacked by
NATO, though there were many progressive forces in North
Africa who critically supported the NATO intervention due to their
hatred of Qaddafi. In Syria,
the peaceful uprising now has the feature of a combination of a popular
democratic revolt layered with a proxy war (of Iran
vs. Saudi Arabia
and their Arab/Persian Gulf allies).
Third, organization beats
lack of organization. One of the reasons the right-wing Islamists have been
able to succeed as well as they have is that they possess organization. It is
important, however, to note that a very strange game existed between the
right-wing Islamists and the authoritarian regimes. To the extent to which they
helped to weaken or crush the political Left (the Sudan being an example of the
latter), the Islamists were seen as acceptable allies by these authoritarian
governments and their protectors in the USA. When the right-wing Islamists
became too audacious, they were then perceived as a threat. In either case,
they frequently had a public existence. Forces on the political Left, however,
were subject to relentless persecution, weakening their ability to organize.
There is another side to this
question of organization, however. In the midst of the massive demonstrations
that shook many of these countries, e.g., Tahir Square in Cairo, it was easy for many protestors to
believe that organization was not necessarily critical and that the sheer force
of the masses would push through a more complete revolutionary process. Nothing
could have been further from the truth.
The Arab democratic uprisings
helped to set in motion popular upsurges in other parts of Africa, in Europe
and the United States.
However, they have yet to complete their mission. Whether they will do so or
whether they will recede like a huge wave returning to the sea, only time will
tell. In either case, the people of the Arab World demonstrated that a
sensational challenge to the old order and its sponsors in the West could be
undertaken. To go further will probably necessitate new social movements and
levels of organization that recognize that the process of social transformation
goes far beyond cultural and/or religious reaffirmation but must be one that
engages the totality of the dispossessed in bringing into being a genuine
emancipation.
|
