Now
that the legitimate President of Honduras, Manuel Zeleya, is sequestered
in "negotiations" in Costa Rica with Roberto Micheletti,
the very man, who ordered his kidnapping at gun point and removal
from the country, we can ask: what does it mean to "negotiate"
with the perpetrators of a coup?
The President of Costa Rica, Oscar Arias, is supposed to be mediating
some kind of compromise. Is Zelaya himself, the legitimately elected
President, expected to compromise? Is Micheletti somehow Zelaya's
equal here? What, exactly is up for negotiation?
Although
many on the far right are crying out that Zelaya himself was trying
to subvert the Honduran constitution-- which he wasn't -- it is
certainly clear that Micheletti and his oligarchs could have followed
a legal procedure had that been the case. The Honduran constitution
allows for impeachment, as well as a precise legal structure in
which an official can be officially charged and allowed to defend
himself. Micheletti and General Romeo Vasquez, by contrast, with
the support of the Honduran Supreme Court and most of Congress,
completely subverted the rule of law and occupied the country militarily.
Since the U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton announced last
Wednesday that Arias would mediate a potential solution, Honduran
trade unionists, human rights groups and scholars have expressed
alarm about the very concept of negotiating with those who perpetrate
coups. We can join them in underscoring the danger of making concessions
to those who launched, supported and carried out a military coup,
and the potential for setting a dangerous precedent in doing so.
As German Zepeda, president of the Coalition of Honduran Banana
and Agroindustrial Unions, noted on Wednesday: "Does this mean
that in any country in the region, you can launch a coup d'etat
and you'll be rewarded with negotiation?" As he points out,
the U.S. initiative in setting up mediation "could convert
itself into the norm for future politics in the region."
Leticia Salomon, a prominent Honduran sociologist and economist,
in an extended analysis released on July 3, underscores the key
elements necessary in any solution to the conflict: not only the
restitution of President Zelaya to office, but a removal from power
of all those who violated the law in supporting the coup -- including
the highly politicized judges of the Supreme Court, the military,
and those in Congress who voted to support the bogus presidency
of Micheletti, and who falsified documents in which Zelaya supposedly
renounced his office.
"Human Rights Are Not Negotiable," declared the Center
for Investigation and Promotion of Human Rights (CIPRODEH)
of Honduras -- an independent civil society group, not to be confused
with the pro-coup human rights office of Micheletti's false government.
In a letter released on July 8, they note that we cannot accept
impunity for those who have violated human rights throughout Honduras
in the past 10 days through kidnapping, torture, illegal detentions,
repression of demonstrations and murder.
They specify a set of minimal demands which begin with the immediate
demilitarization of the country. Many outside Honduras are not aware
that from the moment the coup began, the army occupied all government
facilities in the entire country. Police forces were subsumed under
military control. Civil liberties, including the right to freedom
of expression and travel and against home searches, have been suspended.
Second,
they demand an end to the use of chemical and lethal weapons to
repress demonstrations, and the removal of the Armed Forces from
responsibility for managing public demonstrations. They also call
for the return to civil control of all public services, electric
power, telecommunications, hospitals, and other bodies, which are
currently being controlled by the military.
Given the involvement of so many key political actors in the coup,
the situation is extremely difficult. In imagining a solution, it's
nonetheless essential to eschew a scenario in which concessions
are made to those who perpetrated the coup, in some kind of "compromise"
in which the generals, justices, and members of Congress who perpetrated
this are allowed to continue in office. As Salomon underscores,
it will be necessary to draw on judges from outside the country
to bring justice to the situation.
Nor
should the coup lead to concessions to U.S. power. When Jean Bertrand
Aristide, president of Haiti, was overthrown in a 1991 coup, the
U.S. flew him back on a plane and restored him to power, but with
a price: that Aristide support the policies of the World Bank and
International Monetary Fund, which notoriously led to even worse
poverty and a second coup. In Honduras today, Greg Grandin cautions
in The Nation, "Washington should follow the lead of the rest
of the Americas and resist the temptation to attach conditions to
its support for his return to office."
Any solution to the coup must take into account the very conditions
that led to it, not just the now-famous mass poverty in Honduras,
but the lockdown on the political process by the two ruling parties
and a handful of oligarchs, who have run Hondurans for decades,
with armed support from the U.S. government at Soto Cano (Palmerola)
Air Force Base.
In
the United States, we hear a lot about "no concessions to terrorists."
As we move forward in what we hope is a new political era, we must
also avoid giving concessions to those who perpetrate coups -- especially
in Latin America, where the United States still needs to prove that
it is unequivocally opposed to military coups and will not use them
to its strategic advantage.
Note:
More than 35 scholars and experts on Latin America have sent an
open letter to U.S.
Secretary of State Hillary Clinton urging against the idea of early
elections in Honduras as a possible resolution of the current crisis
resulting from the June 28 military coup d'etat. New American Media
(NAM) contributor, University
of California, Santa Cruz Professor Dana Frank is among them.
This commentary originally appeared in New American
Media (NAM).
BlackCommentator.com Guest Commentator
Dr. Dana Frank, PhD is professor of history at the University of
California, Santa Cruz, and the author of Bananeras: Women Transforming
the Banana Unions of Latin America. Click here
to contact Dr. Frank. |