On February 6, 2007, The United States of America’s
State Department published an article called U.S. Creating
New Africa Command to Coordinate Military Efforts. In this
article, it mentioned that “the Defense Department is
creating a new U.S. Africa Command headquarters, to be known
as AFRICOM, to coordinate all U.S. military and security interests
throughout the continent [with the exception of Egypt].”
In an official statement by the Bush administration, the aim
of AFRICOM is to “strengthen our security cooperation
with Africa and create new opportunities to bolster the capabilities
of our partners in Africa.” Rumors of AFRICOM started
to circulate in September, 2006, in publications such as Time
Magazine that speculated on reasons for the implementation
of such a program. Time referred to developments of
AFRICOM as “the most glaring admission that the U.S. military
needs to dramatically readjust how it will fight what it calls
the long war.” On October 1, 2007, Theresa Whelan, Deputy
Assistant Secretary of the Defense for African Affairs, testified
before the Subcommittee on Africa and Global Health, as part
of the US House Committee on Foreign Affairs (HCFA), stating
that AFRICOM has attained the status under the European Command
of a sub-unified command and will be fully operational by October,
2008.
Since the initial speculations in September,
2006, the United States has steady moved forward in the implementation
of AFRICOM as a historic foreign military presence in Africa
- preceded only by the occupations by European nations during
the colonial era. It is because of the traumatic reference to
history that this unraveling policy inspires agitation in the
responses to AFRICOM by the majority of African leaders and
Africa advocates. For example, organizations like the Southern
African Development Community (SADC) and TransAfrica Forum have
been outspoken in their opposition to AFRICOM with new organizations
(ex. Africans Against Africom), following suit in their opposition
to such a seemingly natural step in U.S. military history. After
all, AFRICOM is not the first U.S. Command to come into existence;
the Pentagon already has five geographic Unified Combatant Commands
around the world - of which issues pertaining to Africa have
been distributed to three regional central commands:
- The European Command, headquartered in Stuggart,
Germany
- Pacific Command, headquartered in Camp H.M.
Smith, Hawaii
- Central Command, headquartered in Tampa
Bay, Florida
With the US owning or renting over 700 military
bases in 130 countries around the world, not inclusive of the
6,000 bases within the United States and the surrounding territories,
the grounds in which opposition to AFRICOM stand are primarily
based not only on broader oppositions to what is dubbed the
Military Industrial Complex but also on the implications that
such an expansive structure has for a continent already grappling
with various disempowering issues such as poverty and low access
to treatment for various physical ailments plaguing the inhabitants.
This paper will examine the factors in which opposition to AFRICOM
are rooted, as well as examine the response strategies of these
oppositions that are based in artistic expression.
There have been many movements, specific to
African liberation, that have incorporated song, music, dance
and visual art as an organizing strategy to effect desired political
change. It is with this knowledge that this paper focuses on
the hot button policy issues concerning AFRICOM as a potential
modern case study for how the arts can be better implemented
to stop the execution of public policies that hold within them
latent detrimental social consequences. Due to the contemporary
nature of AFRICOM, a lot of what will be asserted in this paper
is admittedly speculation. However, these speculations will
draw from history for examples of not only previous military
domination but also the organized non-violent and artistic reactions
that have helped stop the realization of exploitative policies
enforced by military impositions. Also, in an effort to understand
the historic context in which opposition toward AFRICOM is based,
this paper will broadly examine US foreign policy from the specific
angle of the Military Industrial Complex – a term introduced
in the early days of the Cold War, where the government and
corporations collaborate to create and institutionalize power
concentrations that are out of the control of the public.
AFRICOM Dissected
There are two angles to look at when considering
AFRICOM:
- African history with colonial rule
- US rise to power through military growth
Although the United Sates of America was not
a direct collaborator in colonizing Africa, there are certain
key points in history that merge these two stories. First of
all, prior to what is known as the US Colonial Period (1600
– 1775), Africans were being exported abroad as early
as 1441 with an estimated 9,556,000 slaves transported between
the years of 1441 – 1866. The United States of America
earned its independence from British colonial rule in 1776,
so for 110 years the US officially benefited from free African
labor – a story that lays the foundation to all US and
African relations.
African Colonial Legacy
Despite the fact that the US was a full participant
in the first international trade deal between African and Western
nations, with the exception of Liberia, the US was exempt from
direct colonial occupation of African territories. It is through
this lens that the African Colonial Period is widely viewed.
From the late nineteenth century until the late twentieth century,
Africa was under imperial domination from several European nations.
The mechanisms used to institute foreign colonial domination
were a combination of military occupation and skilled diplomacy.
As a historian recounted:
Never in the history of Africa did so many
changes occur and with such speed as they did between 1880
and 1935. As late as 1990, only very limited areas of Africa
had come under the direct rule of Europeans and African rulers
and lineages heads were in control of their independence and
sovereignty…But by 1914, with the sole exception of
Ethiopia and Liberia, the whole of Africa had been partitioned
and occupied by the imperial powers of France, Britain, Germany,
Portugal, Belgium, Spain and Italy and colonialism had been
installed.
As
stated earlier, the Trans Atlantic slave trade began in 1441
so from that point until the mid-nineteenth century, there was
a lapse of approximately 300 years of African-European relations
in which African territories were sovereign and independent.
Many African leaders opposed an alternative relationship, despite
suggestions by Europeans for them to give up their sovereignty
in order to warrant protection from invasion. For example, here
is a recount from an Asante ruler in reaction to a British offer
of protection for the Asante kingdom:
The suggestion that Asante in its present state
should come and enjoy the protection of Her Majesty the Queen
and Empress of India I may say is a matter of very serious
consideration and which I am happy to say we have arrived
at this conclusion, that my kingdom of Asante will never commit
itself to such a policy. Asante must remain as of old at the
same time to remain friendly with all white men.
Many rulers throughout the various kingdoms and
communities in Africa responded in a similar manner to that
of the Asante. However, due to the Industrial Revolution, the
Europeans were able to upgrade their weaponry and, with this
technology, they were able to militarily defeat the African
resistance, killing of many prominent leaders of various tribes.
As a result, colonialism as remembered today, became a fully
functional operation with several military posts set up in what
are now African cities and towns. These military posts were
set up primarily to enforce colonial policies that would be
met with opposition by the indigenous residents. This was the
case in the Aba Women’s Rebellion in southeastern Nigeria,
in which women organized and decided to revolt against taxes
imposed by British rule.
This
history of European military domination in Africa that led to
the undesired colonial era has shaped the ways in which many
African leaders are responding to AFRICOM. For example, South
Africa, Nigeria and Libya have all made statements opposing
AFRICOM. These rejections come as a surprise to many, as all
three of these powerhouses in Africa have much to gain from
the promises of AFRICOM to make more monies available for infrastructure
and other development needs.
US Military Industrial Complex
On January 17, 1941, President Dwight D. Eisenhower
made a heartfelt farewell address, warning the US about the
Military Industrial Complex. During this televised broadcast
he stated:
Until the latest of our world conflicts, the
United States had no armaments industry. American makers of
plowshares could, with time and as required, make swords as
well. But now we can no longer risk emergency improvisation
of national defense; we have been compelled to create a permanent
armaments industry of vast proportions. Added to this, three
and a half million men and women are directly engaged in the
defense establishment. We annually spend on military security
more than the net income of all United States corporations.
This conjunction of an immense military establishment and
a large arms industry is new in the American experience. The
total influence – economic, political, even spiritual
– is felt in every city, every Statehouse, every office
of the Federal government. We recognize the imperative need
for this development. Yet we must not fail to comprehend its
grave implications. Our toil, resources and livelihood are
all involved, so is the very structure of our society. In
the councils of government, we must guard against the acquisition
of unwarranted influence, whether sought or unsought, by the
military industrial complex. The potential for the disastrous
rise of misplaced power exists and will persist.
As stated in the speech, prior to World War I
and II, “the United States had no armaments industry”
and worked to build up a powerhouse so as to protect against
the potential threats that war invaders from both Europe and
Asia posed – as well as to come to the aide of allied
European nations during this era. At the same time, as the US
built up its military capacity, the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics (USSR) was also coming into power with an equally
expansive military system. Interestingly, the US and the USSR
were allies at combating against the fascist states of Italy
and Germany during World War II but before the end of the war,
they disagreed on policies concerning post-war reconstruction
efforts. On March 5, 1946, shortly after the end of World War
II, in his famous “Iron Curtain” speech, given at
Westminster College in Fulton, Missouri, Winston Churchill warned
Western Democracies against the USSR, stating that they “cannot
afford…to work on narrow margins, offering temptation
to a trial of strength,” and that “…nobody
knows what Soviet Russia and its Communist international organization
intends to do in the immediate future, or what the limits if
any to their expensive and proselytizing tendencies.”
It was this band of Western Democracies against the United Communist
states that birthed the arms struggle between the US and USSR,
otherwise known as the Cold War.
Ironically, the Cold War was not an official
war against the rising Superpower nations but was rather a sort
of game between the US and USSR to sponsor smaller arms struggles
between conflicts around the world with opposing forces that
aligned themselves with either capitalism(i.e. pro US) or communism
(i.e. pro USSR). It was during this era that both of these nations
built up their military forces to what is now known as the Military
Industrial Complex. However, since the end of the Cold War,
marked by the dissolution of the USSR in the early 1990s, the
US has steady built up a remarkable military force competent
of the most modern technology available and is unmatchable by
any other nation in the world. As noted earlier in this paper,
the US has over 700 military bases in about 130 countries in
the world - a record breaker that supercedes the efforts of
the military forces of the Colonial Period of European world
domination.
As a result of the Cold War, African nations
became pawns for the US and the USSR, resulting in a series
of coup d’etats and assignations that colored the early
years of post-colonial Africa. Most notably, the Iran-Contra
scandal exposed many of the covert US tactics to monitor and
annihilate non-US friendly regimes in many regions of the world,
including Africa, through joint intelligence and military efforts.
Although Iran-Contra was specifically about the Reagan administration’s
illegal arming of counterrevolutionary (otherwise known as “contra”)
forces in Nicaragua as well as selling weapons to the Iranian
government to secure the release of US citizens held hostage
in Lebanon, the ensuing reports opened a slew of investigations
about US foreign policy, in particular regarding the military.
Though President Reagan was not implicated in any of the charges,
the Iran-Contra scandal exposed the operational control of the
“contra” program shift from the Central Intelligence
Agency (CIA) to the National Security Council (NSC), where high
US officials would solicit “contra” military aide
from private individuals and third countries, inclusive of South
Africa and Middle Eastern nations.
Since
the end of the Cold War, US and Africa military relations have
been based on bilateral and multilateral joint training programs
and military exercises in which the US would provide military
training to African military personnel through a wide variety
of training and education programs. It is also important to
note that many of the programs were set up after the September
11, 2001 attacks on US soil, as part of counter-terrorism strategies.
Listed below is a summary of current US military programs in
Africa as published in an article by Daniel Volman of the African
Security Research Project in Washington, DC:
• Flintlock 2005 and 2007:
a program of Joint Combined Exchange Training (JCECT) conducted
by units of the U.S. Army Special Forces and the U.S. Army
Rangers, along with contingents from other units, to provide
training experience for both American troops and for the troops
of African countries. The first training took place in June,
2005, in which over a thousand US personnel were sent to North
and West Africa for counter-terrorism exercises in Algeria,
Senegal, Mauritania, Mali, Niger, and Chad that involved more
than three thousand local service members. As part of the
Operation Enduring Freedom-Trans-Saharan Counter-Terrorism
Partnership (TSCTP), the second training conducted in both
April and August, 2007, was with forces from Mali, Algeria,
Chad, Mauritania, Morocco, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Tunisia,
Burkina Faso, France, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom.
• Africa Contingency Operations
Training and Assistance Program (ACOTA): This program
replaced the 1997 African Crisis Response Initiative launched
under Bill Clinton’s administration. In 2004, it became
part of the Global Peace Operations Initiative and is officially
designed to provide training to African military forces to
improve both offensive and defensive operations in order to
enhance their ability to conduct peacekeeping operations.
This controversial program is also argued to enhance the ability
to enforce police operations against unarmed civilians, counter-insurgency
operations, and even conventional military operations against
the military forces of other countries. Participating African
countries include Benin, Bostwana, Burkina Faso, Ethiopia,
Gabon, Ghana, Kenya, Malawi, Mali, Mozambique, Namibia, Niger,
Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal, South Africa, Tanzania, Uganda and
Zambia.
• International Military Education
and Training Program (IMET): This program brings
African military officers to military academies and other
military educational institutions in the United States for
professional training. In the 2006 fiscal year, this program
trained 14,731 students from Africa (excluding Egypt) and
continues to train students from nearly all African countries.
• Foreign Military Sales Program
(FMS): Under the Defense Security Cooperation Agency
of the Defense Department, this program sells US military
equipment to African countries. This program is administered
by the Military Financing Program (FMF), which provides loans
to African nations in order to finance the purchase of this
equipment, however, repayment of these loans is almost always
waived. It the 2006 fiscal year, sub-Saharan African countries
received about $14 million and North African countries received
about $21 million through FMF funding.
• African Coastal and Border
Security Program (ACBS Program): This program provides
specialized equipment (i.e. patrol vessels and vehicles, communications
equipment, night vision devices and electronic monitors and
sensors) to African countries for the improvement of their
ability to patrol and defend their own coastal waters and
boarders from terrorist operations, smuggling, etc.
• Excess Defense Articles Program
(EDA): This program administers a transfer of surplus
US military equipment to foreign governments. As a part of
this program:
- South Africa and Bostwana have received
C-130 planes
- Uganda has received trucks
- Senegal has received M-16 rifles
- Nigeria has received coastal patrol vessels
• Combined Joint Task Force-Horn
of Africa (CJTF-HOA): Established in 2002, as part
of the US Central Command, this project was set up to detect
and counter terrorist activities in the areas surrounding
the Red Sea, Gulf of Aden, and the eastern Indian Ocean. This
effort is based at Camp Lemonier in Djibouti and is made up
of approximately 1,400 US military personnel who work with
multinational navies from France, Italy, Germany and other
NATO allies. In January 2007, the CJTF-HOA provided intelligence
to Ethiopia in support of its invasion of Somalia.
• Joint Task Force Aztec Silence
(JTFAS): In December of 2003, the U.S. European Command
created this joint task force under the commander of the US
Sixth Fleet (Europe) to share information with US intelligence
agencies and African military forces. This program carries
out counter-terrorism and surveillance operations in North
and West Africa and coordinates U.S. operations with countries
in those regions.
These
facts, exemplifying pre-AFRICOM US military relations in Africa,
add to the various protests against the implementation of AFRICOM,
as it would increase an already alarming US military presence
in the region. There is much speculation of the underlining
motivations of AFRICOM coming into existence at this time –
some of which include US interest in Africa’s oil and
other resources. These speculations are not so farfetched if
viewed from the broader historic context of African nations’
relating with Western nations as well as the pre-existing US
military presence in Africa (both during and after the Cold
War).
Strategic Incorporation of the Arts:
A Case Study
Much of what is being witnessed in this contemporary
issue of AFRICOM can be addressed from many historical angles.
As stated in sections above, a review of colonial military presence
in Africa is necessary in comprehending opposition toward AFRICOM,
as noted by SADEC and other groups within Africa. It is also
important to review the factors that have shaped US foreign
policy in general as it relates to the Military Industrial Complex,
in an effort to understand opposition to AFRICOM coming from
organizations within the US such as TransAfrica Forum. In the
case of strategic means of effecting change, as exemplified
by sound and logical opposition toward such a policy as AFRICOM,
it is also necessary to draw on some historical context. There
are many ways to show opposition toward policies and, as this
paper has exemplified, military means have been well exercised
in the past century. However, there are other means of effecting
change that do not result in arms struggles or in supporting
the Military Industrial Complex. Around the world, there are
many examples of non-violent efforts to show opposition that
were effective in not inspiring or utilizing the sophisticated
military technology we see in the development of guns, tanks
and bombs. It is estimated that about 80% of war victims are
women and children. With this in mind, it is essential that
there be increased effort at incorporating successful means
of opposing damaging policies without devastating those who
are most vulnerable in conflict situations. In indigenous Africa,
song, music and dance have been used in both violent and non-violent
disputes – depending on the desired result of using such
arts. The aim of highlighting the Aba Women’s Market Rebellion
is not only to illustrate how African women have opposed colonial
impositions but also to show alternate non-violent, yet effective,
organizing strategies to achieve desired goals of change.
Policy Review: Riot or Rebellion? The
Women’s Market Rebellion of 1929
The Aba Women’s Market Rebellion of 1929,
also known as the Aba Women’s Riot, was a pioneering event
of movement, remarkable for the ingenious organizing strategies
that incorporated song and dance, was as militant as any liberation
struggle before or after. The fact that it was organized by
African women in times of European male colonial domination
of the territory called Nigeria – one of the most lucrative
colonies – is a credit to the courage and diligence it
took to ensure the participants' imprints on the pages of history.
In addition to being respected for the biological role of childbirth,
African women are also widely respected for their participation
in agricultural production, trade and other economic pursuits
for the sustainability of their communities. It is with this
self-awareness of the their importance to the sustainability
of enterprising efforts that these women organized and decided
to revolt against the imposition of taxes, as was noted in the
literature in review, Riot or Rebellion.
At the end of 1929, just when the government
was congratulating itself upon the success with which the difficult
task of introducing direct taxation into the provinces had been
accomplished, rioting of a serious and unusual kind broke out
in Calabar and Owerri. In Owerri province, in the heart of the
Igbo country, where a particularly dense population inhabits
the palm forest, there is a place called Oloko. Here, a warrant
chief, Okugo, under instructions from the district officer,
was making a reassessment of the taxable wealth of the people.
In his attempt, he counted the women, children, and domestic
animals. A rumor at once spread among the women that the recently
introduced taxation of men was to be extended to them.
This report was documented by Margery Perham,
a British woman who dedicated her career to studying British
colonial administration and was concerned with moral and ethics
of colonial rule. She was noted for being “fiercely critical
of British rule and was the scourge of the Colonial Office.
She wanted to know why the British had opposed the development
of nationalism and how they might assist nationalists, especially
in Africa, in building new nations.” An interesting discovery
was that most of the primary sources used in studying the Aba
Women’s Riot were compiled by the British, who were more
interested in understanding how they could have miscalculated
their “citizens” and hence began gathering intelligence
information on the Igbo people. It is this quest for understanding
the Igbo people, in general, and Eastern Nigerian women, specifically,
that led to policy changes in the colonial structure –
a temporary victory that would be characterized by the lack
of support by the British during the Biafran War (1967-1970).
The question of calling it a rebellion versus
a riot, while a worthy distinction not to be minimized by mere
semantics, is not the focus of this paper. Rather, this paper
aims at highlighting the causations of this women’s movement,
rare in form yet very powerful, especially when reviewed with
awareness of present day analysis of the role of women and development
in Africa.
The
causations were simple enough: the British policy on taxation
of individuals was economically frustrating for these colonial
‘citizens’. As Perham reported, “…the
price of palm-produce was falling, and new customs duties had
put up the cost of several imported articles of daily use.”
The British had first imposed taxes on the men, a case for controversy
yet was tolerated, but the straw that broke the camel’s
back was the further insistence that these taxes be extended
to women, children and animals. The other important, and more
complex, policy trigger to this movement was the creation of
the loathed role of the warrant chief. This colonial role was
extremely disruptive to the traditional system of governance
used in the time prior to British rule. Particular to the Igbos,
there was a de-emphasis on roles such as ‘chiefs’
and ‘kings’ and the few men who managed to acquire
some level of prestige to be acknowledged as great men or chiefs,
did so only after rigorous initiation that was difficult for
most to complete successfully. Despite the rigor toward attaining
this position, the role of the chief did not equate with a king
or ruler but was more akin to spokesperson for the people in
relation with neighboring tribes. In addition, Igbo women had
their organizations that controlled certain spheres of community
life such as priestesses that headed traditional spiritual orders.
This role was also only attained after rigorous initiation.
Igbo women, as most other African women, were able to attain
social standing by successfully trading, farming and weaving
and many Igbo sub-tribes are matrilineal. Though Igbo women
generally did not engage in physical combat, they were key advisors
in war strategies and their place in society was honored as
such. With the implementation of these warrant chiefs, roles
that were imposed by the British mainly to communicate colonial
law, there was a power shift that displaced traditionally held
roles by both women and men.
Perham documents the role of one particular
warrant chief who went by the name Okugo. It was noted that,
as a result of Okugo’s insistence that the women pay taxes,
the women organized themselves in masses and went to all the
houses of the chiefs to verify that this law, in fact, was to
be mandated in all provinces. Perham reports an incident that
followed the implementation of the new tax law:
Okugo, continuing reluctantly to carry out
his orders, sent a messenger to count some of his people.
This man entered a compound and found one of the married women,
Nwanyeruwa, who was pressing oil, to count her goats and sheep.
She replied angrily, ‘Was your mother counted?’
at which they closed, seizing each other by the throat. A
meeting was called and Nwayeruwa’s excited story was
told as confirmation of the rumor.
It was at this point that the women started their
rebellion. Shortly following this incident, masses of women
from the countryside came to the town of Oloko to protest Okugo’s
treatment of Nwayeruwa. Perham documented:
…All night they danced round his house
singing a song quickly invented to meet the situation. Growing
hourly more excited, they went on to Okugo’s compound
where his own people tried to defend him with sticks and bird
arrows. The crowd mobbed him, damaged his house, demanded
his cap of office, and charged him with assault before the
district office of Bende.
This vigilante behavior, without full comprehension
of the consequences of their behavior, would be exhibited in
many other anti-colonial movements around Africa… many
to meet the same fate as the market women of Eastern Nigeria.
After many months of organized demonstrations, the market women’s
movement grew increasingly stronger and was estimated to have
been about fifteen hundred women demonstrating at one time.
Their demands for justice were also increasing in militancy
and as a result mandated military involvement. As Perham reported
on the bloody incident that occurred on December 17, 1929:
…[the women] made threatening and obscene
gestures toward the troops, called them sons of pigs, and
said they knew the soldiers would not fire at them. At last
they struck at the district officer with their sticks. The
lieutenant caught the blows, made signs to the district officer
as to whether he should fire (for it was impossible to make
himself heard in the uproar) and, just as the fence began
to give way before the rush of women, shot the leader through
the head with his revolver. Two volleys were then fired on
the crowd which broke and fled, leaving thirty two dead and
dying, and thirty-one wounded.
Although, the Aba Women’s Market Rebellion
of 1929 ended in bloodshed, there were many achievements attained.
For one, a flood gate had opened for the plight of African women
under colonial rule, that was to be revisited in 1947 in the
Egba Women’s War, which was spearheaded by Yoruba women
in South Western Nigeria and predicated by similar triggers
of taxation, lack of political representation, the oppressive
excesses of the warrant chiefs, court clerks and the police.
Another major achievement of the Aba Women’s Market Rebellion
of 1929 was the abolition of the warrant chief system in the
Igbo region. The warrant chiefs were replaced by Ezeala, or
sacred authority holders of their communities, and the process
of identifying these Ezeala’s was a democratic system
that involved the input of the women, who where also now allowed
to serve as members of the Native Court (a restorative justice
court system rooted in indigenous beliefs of justice). The taxation,
however, remained.
AFRICOM and the Future
Herein lies the rare point in history where
people decide what position to take on an issue that has the
potential to impact many generations to come. It is unknown
at this time what the true impact of AFRICOM will be, but for
many who draw on history to project the future, it has the potential
to invite another generation of oppressive impositions throughout
the African continent. Just as many ancient African kingdoms
refused the presence and alleged protection of the European
military forces throughout the nineteenth and early part of
the twentieth centuries, the idea of AFRICOM is being received
in similar ways by presidents of some of the most powerful African
nations. Whatever repercussions such strong opposition holds
for US-Africa relations remains to be seen, however, it is within
the capacity of the masses to organize and implement various
strategies of expressing opposition in order to effect policy
change. This paper aims at promoting a strategy that utilizes
some of what is believed to come naturally to Africans: song,
music and dance. Given that the present world has been largely
shaped by the Military Industrial Complex, it is crucial to
explore other sources of resolving conflicts that do not threaten
the vulnerable populations of women and children. As was the
case with the Aba Women’s Revolt in southeastern Nigeria,
the arts served as a strong force in changing policy. These
women were militant and determined in their desire to block
the imposition of taxes. Their strategy not only worked but
inspired similar successful revolts in other neighboring regions.
It is with this in mind that this paper encourages more organizing
efforts to implement the arts, with the desire to effect change
for generations to come.
Chioma "Journey Woman" Oruh is
an artivist (artist + activist) originally of the Igbo tribe
located in southeast Nigeria. She is also currently a graduate
student in the African Studies at Howard University with a focus
on music and its affects on liberation movements. Click
here to contact Ms. Oruh.