On 4 June 2007, in two separate cases, two
different military judges dismissed charges against two detainee/defendants,
Salim
Hamdan, and Omar Khadr. Respectively, the men were to be arraigned
as the first step in their prosecutions via a newly crafted American
system of Kafkaesque justice called “military commissions.”[1] While
human rights attorneys, social justice advocates, and even constitutional
scholars might see the dismissals as “victories” for the defendants
and or the rule of law, or even an internal revolt of the Bush
dictatorship and his penchant for Alice in Wonderland Courts
(where detainees are literally declared guilty before the trial
or hearing), we have reason to be skeptical.
In the recent past, there have been many federal court rulings
on the Bush war on terror [sic], mass detention, and torture. Rulings
from the Supreme Court and lower federal courts in cases such
as Padilla v. Rumsfeld (CA2 2003), Rasul v. Bush (2004), Padilla
v. Hanft (DC SC 2004), In re Guantánamo Detainee Cases (DDC
2005) and Hamdan v. Rumsfeld (2006), have declared that
detainees cannot be tortured, must be given access to attorneys,
have the right to some court process to challenge their detention,
and must be charged with cognizable crimes or released. In response
such admonishments, however mild, the Bush regime has ignored
such decisions, gone forum shopping to find more amenable judges,
moved detainees, denied attorneys access to their clients, invented
charges, shipped detainees to Bush-friendly torture states like
Syria, Egypt and Saudi Arabia, proclaimed that detainees on hunger-strike
or who attempt suicide are fighting asymmetrical warfare![2]
and continued to hold men and boys in isolation – using the no-touch
torture practice of sensory deprivation. So when Bush attorneys
were told that the commissions authorized under the Military
Commissions Act of 2006 (MCA) had no jurisdiction to try any
of the Gitmo detainees, Bush team prosecutors said they would
either appeal (which is probably not permitted under the MCA)
and/or reclassify the detainees [3] (which is not allowed under
the MCA and probably violates constitutional prohibitions on
double-jeopardy) and then charge and try any and all 380 Gitmo
detainees for acts defined as crimes under the MCA.
What we should appreciate is that no one
in Gitmo, or any other Bush dungeon around the world, is going
free anytime soon. Note
the charges against Hamdan and Khadr were dismissed without prejudice
and the two have not been released. And no one is going to make
Bush and his military let these 380 out of the hell called Guantánamo. As
a result of this military opt-out, court acquiescence and Congressional
spinelessness, Bush and crew may continue to hold these men – forever!
Particulars and the Dismissals
The Bush administration
charged Hamdan with two offenses: (1) conspiring with Osama
bin Laden and others to commit acts of terrorism; and (2) providing
material support for terrorism via being a driver for Osama bin
Laden, carrying weapons (such weapons never used in any of said
violent acts) and receiving training at a so-called al Qaida
training camp.[4]
Though the Bush regime brought a litany of charges against Mr.
Khadr, who was not yet 16 years-old at the time of any of his
belligerence against American liberators in Afghanistan,
all of the allegations of Khadr’s misdeeds are variations on
a theme. In sum, Mr. Khadr is alleged to have committed two
principal acts: (1) he received training on explosives
at an al Qaida camp in Afghanistan; and (2) while Americans were
shooting at him, Khadr, threw a grenade, killing an American,
Sgt. First Class, Christopher Speer (that Speer was in Afghanistan,
and part of an illegal invasion and overthrow of the local government
is not mentioned in the charges).
At Hamdan’s arraignment, Judge Allred found that in October,
2004, a Combatant Status Review Tribunal determined that Hamdan
was an “enemy combatant.” Given that the jurisdiction of the
commissions created under the MCA only allows the commissions
to try “unlawful enemy combatants” (i.e. spies, or other non-privileged
belligerents as defined by the laws of war, Geneva Conventions
and other relevant authorities),[5] Judge Allred correctly found
that Hamdan could not be tried before his court.
Similarly, in Khadr’s arraignment, Judge Brownback found that
no relevant authority had determined that Mr. Khadr was indeed
an unlawful enemy combatant. Brownback added that under the
MCA, there is no provision for the trial judge to determine whether
a detainee was, under law, an unlawful enemy combatant. Thus,
Col. Brownback, too, dismissed the charges against Khadr.
Again, what is particular troubling for any of us concerned
with due process, limited government and freedom as protected
through principles of habeas corpus, prohibitions on bills
of attainder, ex post facto laws, and some of the evidentiary
and procedural protections developed through common law and American
courts for criminal defendants – no forced confessions, limitations
on hearsay, the right to confront an accuser, etc., is that these
charges were dismissed without prejudice. That is, the
military judges – who presumably like their careers in the military – held
that Bushevik attorneys can refile the charges after someone
or some tribunal declares that Hamdan, Khadr and others are “unlawful
enemy combatants.”
While I expect Bush attorneys to discover
new ways both to bring charges and to extract convictions (which
will allow military
judges to impose the death penalty), there are a number of reasons
to believe that such efforts, if achieved, will be illegal under
the Constitution and the MCA itself. But the cynic in me finds
that Team Bush will capitalize on these “losses” as they have
done with other judicial rulings.
MCA specifics
The MCA is so poorly written that its provision defining the
jurisdiction of the commissions probably works to expose the
law as seeking to impose punishments ex post facto, i.e.
in clear violation of the Constitution. Consider, as written
in § 948d(a):
a military commission
under this chapter shall have jurisdiction to try any offense
made punishable
by this chapter (§948v) or the law of war when committed by
an alien unlawful enemy combatant before, on, or after September
11, 2001.
Section §948v of the MCA provides a litany of crimes and §948d
provides jurisdiction to try these new offenses – in
this new court. In normal American jurisprudence, and as delineated
in Art I §9 of the U.S. Constitution, as the MCA was enacted
on 17 October 2006, any action committed prior to the creation
of the law, cannot subject one to punishment ex post facto. Yet
the MCA clearly authorizes the military to try detainees for
actions that occurred at anytime in the past.
Generalities aside, in particular, the
MCA defines as criminal, “conspiracy in
a war.” Such a crime never existed under the
Laws of War and was not a crime for which one could be charged
in a military tribunal or court martial prior to October
2006. In this sense, as it adds the darling of law enforcement,
the “crime of conspiracy” (see §948v(b)(28)), to the arsenal
of military (in) justice, the MCA purports to allow irregular
military tribunals to charge and convict defendants via an ex
post facto law.
As well, in relation to the reference
to the Laws of War, how can one have violated a “law of war” when there was no
war? That is, if we assume, as the Bush administration is
wont to claim, that “they attacked us” and “the world changed
after 9/11” in that the “war started on 9/11” then any act
committed by a belligerent prior to 9/11 cannot – save
planning for aggressive war (which arguably cannot be applied
to non-state actors, but that the U.S. military does continually – and
has done for years) – serve as grounds for charge and conviction. Of
course, the MCA announces that detainee acts prior to this
war can serve as the basis for one’s conviction.
What about the crime of providing material
support to terrorists? The
Bush regime theory about “material support” for terrorism constructs
a new meaning for that well-understood idea. Providing aid
and comfort to the enemy is about providing shelter, food,
weapons, and materials – hence the term, “material support.” In
the post 9/11 Alberto in Terror-land courts, when one
has received weapons training, when one attends a political
rally or military training facility, the receiver is a provider/giver. Thus,
with a twist of logic and rebuke of the plain meaning of words
(actually one of the best talents of Bush lawyers), Hamdan,
Khadr and the rest, mere foot soldiers at best, are constructed
as financiers, weapons makers, and military advisors. Such
prosecutorial construction flies in the face of the plain meaning
of the crime as defined is the MCA, now 10 USC §950v(b)(25)(A)
which defines the offense of providing material support for
terrorism as:
“knowingly or intentionally giving material
support or resources to be used in preparation for, or in carrying
out, an act of terrorism, or intentionally providing material
support or resources to an international terrorist organization
engaged (present tense) in hostilities against the United States,
knowing that such organization has engaged or engages in terrorism …”
If the Prosecution Won't
Fly, We Just Reclassify
But recall, the military judges did not
rail on the inanity and inconsistency of the MCA, the Uniform
Code of Military
Justice, Constitutional jurisprudence, the Law of War, and
relevant international treaties. Instead, they picked out
the simple matter that the two detainees were labeled as “enemy
combatants” instead of the notably distinct and legally significant
term “unlawful enemy combatants.” But how and when were Hamdan
and Khadr defined as “enemy combatants” (which was in opposition
to the term “civilian”)? More importantly, under the MCA,
what was the legal effect of the previous determination?
When he was still a darling of the media
and his neo-con friends, then Deputy Secretary for the Department
of War [sic], Paul
Wolfowitz, published an order to create so-called “Combatant
Status Review Tribunals” (CRSTs).[6] The CRSTs made quick
determinations as to whether a given detainee was a civilian
or “terrorist.” Hence an arm of the U.S. military had some
type of hearing and defined detainees as “enemy combatants.”
Why was the CRST process so important
for the MCA tribunals? Under
the MCA, §948d(c)
“A finding, whether before, on, or after
the date of the enactment of the Military Commissions Act of
2006, by a Combatant Status Review Tribunal or another competent
tribunal established under the authority of the President or
the Secretary of Defense, that a person is an unlawful enemy
combatant is dispositive for purposes of jurisdiction for trial
by military commission under this chapter.”
Can you appreciate the power of that language? If the military
has determined that one is an “unlawful enemy combatant” (UEC)
then an MCA commission trial judge has no authority to revisit
the issue. While Bush loyalists thought that this section
of the MCA meant that any and all detainees would be found
guilty, by definition, recall UECs are war criminals – always,
at least two military judges understood that the determination
works both ways. Hence, as previous CRST hearings defined
Hamdan and Khadr as something other than UECs, the MCA commissions
could not re-designate the detainees.
But of course, Bush administration attorneys
seek to appeal the dismissal and try these men again. Bushevik arguments
in support of their cause to convict these men take two tracks:
(1) the mere semantic difference between labels like combatant,
enemy combatant and UEC is unimportant; and/or (2) they are
entitled to re-label detainees as UECs at their whim.
The first argument cannot pass the laugh
test. Recall that
given guidance from then White House counsel Alberto Gonzalez,
John Yoo, and now Ninth Circuit Judge Jay Bybee and others,
Bush drafted executive orders as to construct a new universe
of law, whereby thousands of Muslim men could be held not as
POWs, but as slaves – to be tortured and outside the protection
of the Constitution and American laws and the Geneva Conventions. Specifically,
such detention (or vacation as Rush Limbaugh calls it) was
reserved for that special category of UECs. In this case though,
Hamdan and Khadr were found to be enemy combatants not UECs.
As to re-labeling the Gitmo detainees,
there are two huge legal hurdles. One, as written, there is a question as to
whether prosecutors can appeal at all. Second, the principles
of double jeopardy and due process (including collateral estoppel)
should prevent the Bush lawyers from redefining legal enemy
combatants into UECs.
Bush Regime War on American
Jurisprudence
As I read the MCA, I find that the law
makes no provision for the government to appeal – at least in the cases of Hamdan
and Khadr. In few passages of the MCA is there any reference
to appeal – which is to be expected as the law was written
to find convictions of the pre-determined guilty. But where
mentioned, such seems to limit even Busheviks from abusing
their own legal process.
Section 950d(a)(A)(1) is titled “Appeal by the United States.” In
detailing when and why the government can appeal it reads:
“Except as provided in paragraph [§950d(a)](2),
in a trial [sic] by military commission under this chapter,
the United States may take an interlocutory appeal to the Court
of Military Commission Review of any order or ruling of the
military judge that terminates proceedings of the military
commission with respect to a charge or specification.”
Arguably, to understand the full meaning
of this provision, we need to see §950d(a)(2). That reads:
“The United States may not appeal … an
order or ruling that is, or amounts to, a finding of not
guilty by
the military commission with respect to a charge or specification.”
Put together, I am left with two conclusions: (1)
the government can only appeal a matter that occurs during
a trial – not
a pre-trial event like an arraignment; and (2) if an order
finding that the detainees are “lawful combatants” leading
to a dismissal amounts to a finding of not guilty, then
the government cannot appeal. Such conclusions are reinforced
by §950a(a) of the MCA which reads:
“Error of Law. A finding
or sentence of a military commission under this chapter may
not be held incorrect
on the ground of an error of law unless the error materially
prejudices the substantial rights of the accused.” (emphasis
added).
And though later sections of the MCA allude to the possibility
of the government having the right to appeal, related subsections
seem to negate that as well.
As established under the MCA, the first
court of review of a Military Commission is a “Court of Military Commission Review” (CMCR),
where its review is not discretionary. As the chain moves
into the civil courts, namely the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia, and then the Supreme Court, the latter
two have absolute discretion to hear appeals. But there is
a caveat. Aside from the fact that the so-called CMCR is not
staffed, the plain language of the MCA demands that the accused file
the appeal!
Section 950f(c) is titled “Cases To Be Reviewed.” The
section reads”
The Court of Military
Commission Review, … shall
review the record in each case that is referred to the Court … with
respect to any matter of law raised by the accused.
As announced in the MCA thus, there is
no ground for the U.S. to appeal to the CMCR. As well, in reference to the discretionary
courts – beyond the CMCR – the MCA explains that the appeal must come
from the accused.
So while §950d(d) holds that:
The United States may
appeal an adverse ruling … to
the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit by filing a petition for review in the Court of Appeals
within 10 days after the date of such ruling. Review under
this subsection shall be at the discretion of the Court of
Appeals.
the section is tempered by §950g(a)(2):
A petition for review must be filed by
the accused in the Court of Appeals not later than 20
days after [previous proceedings]
Back to Reality
In a 1991 speech, historian Howard Zinn
recounted how one CIA official discounted any limitations
on domestic spying
or abuse of civil liberties. The CIA agent dismissed the idea
that the U.S. Constitution could govern the company’s illegal
practices – “just words on paper” the agent said. “The First
Amendment is just an Amendment.” For the Busheviks,
the latest “setback” allows for more legal delays, appeals,
more negotiation with Congress to “craft laws” and to give
Bush the necessary tools to “fight the war on terror.” That
Mssrs. Hamdan and Khadr are hardly the “worst of the worst” fighting
against the largest imperial military in the world with their
asymmetrical methods of suicide and hunger strikes, is apparently
unimportant. Perhaps the opposite is true, that these men
cannot be held up as justification for torture, stress positions,
waterboarding and sensory deprivation; at least some in the
military would rather avoid bringing the specifics to light.
So long as the American courts continue
to support the idea that the U.S. is at war and that the
war exists anywhere and
everywhere that Bush says – and that the enemy is anyone (definitely
any non-citizen), the Bush regime can hold thousands, even
American citizens, in secret prisons. And when there are no
trials (even the MCA does not require trials, see §948b(d)(A)),
no press seeking to bring out the truth, no Red Cross access,
no protection for ghost prisoners … there can be no justice,
there can be no peace.
BC Columnist Dr John Calvin Jones, PhD, JD has a law
degree and a PhD in Political Science. His Website is virtualcitizens.com. Click
here to contact Dr. Jones.
[1] See Glaberson, William. 2007. “Judge Throws Out Charges
in Guantánamo Prisoner Case.” New York Times, June
4.
[2] BBC. 2006. Guantanamo suicides ‘acts of war.’ BBC, June
11. Quoting then Guantánamo Camp commander, Rear Admiral
Harry Harris, after American officials announced that three
detainees committed suicide, Harris said that “he did not
believe the men had killed themselves out of despair. ‘They
are smart. They are creative, they are committed. They
have no regard for life, either ours or their own. I believe
this was not an act of desperation, but an act of asymmetrical
warfare waged against us.’”
[3] Moore, Matthew. 2007. Guantánamo tribunal plan thrown
into chaos. London Telegraph (UK), June
06.
[4] Specific charge sheet against
Hamdan.
[5] See MCA § 948d(a). Jurisdiction of military commissions. A
military commission under this chapter shall have jurisdiction
to try any offense made punishable by this chapter or the law
of war when committed by an alien unlawful enemy combatant
before, on, or after September 11, 2001.
[6] See order of JAG Capt. Keith Allred of 4 June 2007 in
the case of U.S. v. Hamdan
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