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This article originally appeared on Znet.
Canadian Prime Minister Paul Martin gave a
moving speech at the United Nations on September 22, 2004. "Tens of thousands
have been murdered, raped and assaulted,” he said. “War crimes
and crimes against humanity have been committed."
A courageous act, to say such things about
US foreign policy in Iraq. Even though reports of rape in prisons like Abu Ghraib
are widespread, the word “rape” is never used in the mainstream
US media. Neither is the word “torture”, though Martin didn’t
mention torture in his speech. The US invasion of Iraq, as
straightforward international aggression (not a "pre-emptive" or
even "preventive" strike) definitely counts as a “crime
against humanity”, although again, to say such things in public,
especially on US soil at the United Nations, would have major implications
for a country’s foreign policy and a politician’s career. To
be sure, sniper attacks, aerial bombardments, and the use of helicopter
and other gunships against civilians are “war crimes”, and “tens
of thousands have been murdered” in this way in Iraq, but again,
in the current political climate, no Western politician could be
expected to say so.
It would therefore have been quite impressive
if Paul Martin had actually been talking about the US in Iraq. But
he was not.
Nor was he talking about Palestinian refugees
when he said: “They
are hungry, they are homeless, they are sick and many have been
driven out of their own country." This would have been
particularly true for Palestinian refugees in Gaza, for example,
where the UN special rapporteur for food said last year Israel
is deliberately starving the population through its policy of closures,
resulting in over a fifth of children being malnourished. Israeli
policy hasn’t changed. Instead, attacks on civilian infrastructure
in the occupied territories have continued, as have the sieges
and closures. Malnutrition causes brain damage so that
even when a child has been restored to a proper diet he or she
may continue to suffer developmental problems.
Talk about Palestine or Iraq would not have
earned Paul Martin kudos from US Secretary of State Colin Powell,
who praised him
as “a good friend and neighbor" and declared him “such a leader
in the field.”
What field? Not the killing fields of Haiti, where corpses
of Lavalas activists and Aristide supporters have been piling up
in morgues and graves, some three thousand, and ongoing, since “good
friends and neighbors” and “leaders in the field” Canada and the
United States sent their troops to guarantee the February
coup against Haiti’s democratically elected and massively supported
President.
No, Paul Martin was not talking about Iraq
or Palestine or Haiti. He
was talking about Sudan.
Martin’s concern about mass murder, starvation, and ethnic cleansing
in Sudan, like Powell’s, might seem inconsistent, given their eager
championing of such deeds elsewhere. The same could be said
of US politicians like Republican Senator Bill Frist and Iraq invaders
like Tony Blair. These notables are either lying about their
indignation about what is happening in Sudan, or they are racists,
who just can’t summon indignation for dead third-worlders when
the killers are from the first world or acting on behalf of it.
In fact the consistency is of a different kind. For it is
the selective indignation of the likes of Martin, Blair, and Powell,
and their ilk to the atrocities unfolding under the auspices of
what they term “rogue states” or “failed states” that leads to
the atrocities unfolding under Western occupations. In Haiti,
for example, the formula was clear: first, help a state to “fail” by
denying it aid, applying vicious sanctions and conditionalities,
and arming paramilitary
killers to invade and slaughter their way to the capital. Then
call it a “failed state,” oust its leaders, and occupy the place. Whatever
atrocities occur in response to Western occupation can then be
used as proof of the need for more occupation and intervention. In
Iraq, a genuinely tyrannical and dictatorial state was made to “fail” by
a process of bombing, bleeding by sanctions, and murderous invasion
and occupation. Now, as Blair and Bush’s armies slaughter
Iraqis at will, interventionists argue that the West needs to “stay
the course” lest Iraq, the “failed state,” descend into “civil
war.” Israel’s ongoing massacre, ethnic cleansing and deliberate
starvation program is justified by the interventionists as necessary
because Palestinians can’t find leaders that will recognize Israel’s
security needs.
The Sudan crisis has provided the interventionists
with an opportunity to simply change the subject: “if you care so much about the Palestinians,” they
can ask, “why don’t you care about Sudan? If you care so
much about Iraqis, then why don’t you support intervention to save
people in Sudan?” The next step, of course, is to accuse
those who talk about Western murders and crimes as “anti-Semites,” “anti-Americans,” or
racists. To this, anti-occupation people can reply by calling
the liberal interventionists hypocrites, citing liberal indifference
or contribution to crimes in the above cases as evidence.
Mutual cries of hypocrisy, however, even when
true, won’t help
those who are actually being “murdered, raped and assaulted,” who
are actually “hungry… homeless… sick and… have been driven out
of their own country.” In the specific case of Sudan and
Darfur, for example, the hypocrisy of gangsters like Martin, Powell,
and Blair does not make atrocities in the region any less real,
or the crisis any less urgent.
Lansana Gberie, an Africa expert who has studied
numerous interventions and conflict situations in the continent,
cites liberal interventionists
in his recent paper arguing for intervention in Sudan. But
he also cites very important and credible human rights organizations
like Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, and the UN, whose
estimates of deaths are in the tens of thousands and displaced
people in the hundreds of thousands. These organizations
have sometimes been wrong (Amnesty International, for example,
picked up the phony story about Iraqis murdering Kuwaiti babies
in incubators, helping the propaganda machine of the US devastation
of Iraq in 1991) or disproportionate (some of Human Rights Watch’s
material on Venezuela, for example, has condemned the Chavez government
in disproportionately harsh terms, helping the US campaign against
that government). Their record overall, however, is quite
good, and the evidence they presented in the cases where they have
turned out to be wrong was rather thin and later discredited. The
evidence they have presented on Darfur, however, is solidly documented. Not
to prove “genocide,” but certainly to prove massive suffering.
The story is also quite plausible on its face
(unlike stories of Saddam Hussein’s al-Qaeda links or imminent nuclear threat). For
example, as US-backed paramilitaries in Colombia know, civilian
massacres to drive whole populations into refugee camps can be
a highly effective counterinsurgency strategy, cutting insurgents
off from their support and supply base and terrifying the population
away from them.
Gberie’s paper cites Sudan expert Alex de Waal’s
excellent July 2004 article from
the London Review of Books for background on Darfur. That
background is too extensive to summarize in a short article. Those
concerned about Darfur should read it, and carefully. But
suffice it to say that similar dynamics exist in Darfur’s crisis
as exist in so many other conflicts that plague the third world
today: a legacy of colonial destruction; a postcolonial state that
acts like the colonial state did; an elite that uses the state
as its own private estate to dole out privileges and power; mobilization
along ethnic lines using racist ideologies; interference from outside
powers; closed political spaces leading to armed insurgencies,
and a state that responds to armed insurgencies with vicious counterinsurgency.
De Waal’s recommendations might strike both
anti-imperialists and liberal interventionists as unsatisfactory:
“A huge aid effort is grinding into gear.
But the distances involved mean that food relief is expensive
and unlikely to
be sufficient. It's tempting to send in the British army to
deliver food, but this would be merely symbolic: relief can
be flown in more cheaply by civil contractors, and distributed
more effectively by relief agencies. The areas controlled by
the SLA (Sudan Liberation Army) and JEM (Justice and Equality
Movement) contain hundreds of thousands of civilians who are
not getting any help. As soon as an intrepid cameraman returns
with pictures of this hidden famine, there will be an outcry,
and pressure for aid to be delivered across the front lines.
There's no reason to wait for the pictures before acting, although
it's clear that cross-line aid convoys will need to carry armed
guards.
“The biggest help would be peace. In theory,
there's a ceasefire; in practice, the government and Janjawiid
are ignoring it,
and the rebels are responding in kind. The government denies
that it set up, armed and directed the Janjawiid. It did, but
the monster that Khartoum helped create may not always do its
bidding: distrust of the capital runs deep among Darfurians,
and the Janjawiid leadership knows it cannot be disarmed by
force. When President Bashir promised Kofi Annan and Colin
Powell that he would disarm the militia, he was making a promise
he couldn't keep. The best, and perhaps the only, means of
disarmament is that employed by the British seventy-five years
ago: establish a working local administration, regulate the
ownership of arms, and gradually isolate the outlaws and brigands
who refuse to conform. It took a decade then, and it won't
be any faster today. Not only are there more weapons now, but
the political polarities are much sharper.”
If de Waal’s recommendation of methods used by British colonialists
seems unsavory, Gberie’s advocacy of an African solution might
seem better:
“By the end of August 2004,
the AU had 305 soldiers on the ground in Darfur as part of
a ceasefire monitoring
mechanism, and the UN was working with the AU on a plan that
would raise this force level to 3,000 AU troops and 1,200 police
officers. However, the Sudanese government has rejected AU offers
to increase the size of the force and extend its mandate to include
the protection of civilians, insisting on an AU role that is
limited to observation and monitoring.”
Gberie sensibly argues that the Sudanese
government’s consent
ought to be irrelevant (as irrelevant, for example, as Israel’s
consent ought to be if an international intervention to protect
Palestinians from massacre, assassination, and starvation were
ever mounted). The example he provides, however, is equally
unsavory to anti-imperialists: “However, the issue of consent
should be irrelevant. There was no consent in 1999, to the aerial
bombardment and insertion of some 50,000 NATO troops into Kosovo
in response to the deaths of some 2,000 people.” When one
considers the problems the NATO intervention caused compared
to those it solved, this "success" of "humanitarian
intervention" seems less “humanitarian” and less “successful.” The
same is true of the world’s response to the mass murder in the Congo,
which took place largely in Rwandan and Ugandan-controlled parts
of the Congo between 1998-2001, while the liberal interventionists
were still trying to find ways of using the Rwandan genocide
of 1994/5 as a rhetorical device to justify future Western interventions.
Clearly Ramesh Thakur, Vice Rector of the
UN University, who Gberie also cites, is correct when he argues
that “Western Medicine
is no cure for Darfur’s ills,” and that “a Western intervention,
far from offering a solution, may add to the problems.” Thakur
has good reasons for thinking so. The US’s actions in Afghanistan,
where funds were available for bombing but not for rebuilding,
show that the US is more interested in building bases, controlling
regions, and controlling energy sources than solving local humanitarian
crises. The oil connection in Darfur also casts doubt on
US humanitarian intentions. Sudan is a country with a Muslim
population and, even though the Islamist regime is oppressive
and unpopular, an invasion would do little for pro-US sentiment
in a region where such sentiment is sorely lacking. US
military doctrine, which compensates for its reluctance to risk
its soldiers by using firepower and ruthlessness against non-US
civilians, tends to have very un-humanitarian effects. A
year after the Iraq invasion, there should be little doubt about
any of these points.
Given that, one would have to disagree with the conclusion of
the Black
Commentator’s well-reasoned editorial of September 23, 2004,
that: “No matter how cynical U.S. motives, Colin Powell’s invocation
of the Genocide Convention in Darfur invigorates forces seeking
a more just world. When criminals are compelled to cite the law,
we know that justice is within our reach.” In fact, we
know no such thing. The Colin Powell brand of criminal
always cites the law, whether he’s ignoring it, upholding it,
or tearing it up. Proposals for an African Union intervention
as cited by Gberie, however flawed, could have the best chance
of success (it was African intervention that brought the Congo
civil war to a halt).
The real world demands not allowing genuine
concern for victims of atrocities to be transmuted by interventionist
hypocrites
into apologetics for an imperialism that will ultimately produce
more victims of more atrocities. But those same victims
deserve better than mere denunciations of intervention and its
apologists as hypocrites and warmongers. Perhaps Khalid
Fishawy and Ahmed Zaki of Egyptian alternative media site kefaya.org
posed the challenge for movements best:
“Could we imagine building
a front for the potentials of peoples and democratic movements
in Sudan, hurt
and disaffected by war, with the solidarity of the global antiwar
movement, to impose democratic mechanisms caring for the interests
of oppressed Sudanese communities, races, cultures and classes,
against the rapacity of the interests of US and Western European
Imperialists? Could this aim be possible? Is it promising for
the global justice and peace movement to regain its momentum,
instead of supporting undemocratic authoritarian and fundamentalist
forces, this time in Sudan, under the title of allying with whomever
is against the American Empire?”
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