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"When most progressives think about electoral
politics they think less about strategy and more
about a particular candidacy or set of candidacies,
more often than not candidacies that have not
emerged out of the progressive movements."
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Every
electoral cycle gives me the sense of “Groundhog Day” within
progressive circles. It feels as if the same discussion take places
over and again. No matter what has transpired in the intervening years;
no matter what mass struggles; no matter what theoretical insights;
progressives find themselves debating the relative importance of
electoral politics and the pros and cons of specific candidates. These
debates frequently become nothing short of slugfests as charges are
thrown around of reformism, sell-outs and purism. And then, during the
next cycle, we are back at it.
What has struck me in the current cycle are two related but distinct
problems. First, progressives have no national electoral strategy to
speak of. Second, elections cannot be viewed simply or even mainly
within the context of the pros and cons of specific candidates. In
fact, with regard to the latter, there are much bigger matters at stake
that are frequently obscured by the candidates themselves.
Let’s begin in reverse order. In a recent exchange on Facebook I had
with a friend, he raised the point that Hillary Clinton holds some
positions to the right of Donald Trump. His, apparent, point was that
in a final election, should it come down to Clinton vs. Trump, it would
actually not make much of a difference who won. Someone I do not know
responded to my friend by pointing out that Hitler was to the “left” of
certain candidates as well and that the issue of intolerance needed to
be the point of focus.
Looking at the platform or views of a candidate reveals only part of
the equation. It gives one a sense of the candidate. What is just as
important are the social forces that have assembled around a particular
candidate and the direction of their motion. Let’s go back to Hitler
for a moment. Within the NSDAP (Nazi Party) there were forces on the
left and the right, of course these terms being quite relative. The
Brownshirts, otherwise known as the SA (Stormtroopers) proselytized in
favor of a “national revolution” in Germany. Hitler and his SA
supporters advocated some very radical solutions to the problems facing
Germany. They consciously utilized left-wing symbolism (such as a red
flag as background to the swastika) in order to appeal to the working
class and other disgruntled forces crushed by the economy. They did
this while promoting antisemitism and militarism. On June 30, 1934,
after assuming power and after cementing his alliance with the German
military and major elements of the economic establishment, Hitler and
the SS crushed the SA and any further discussion of a “national
revolution.” While the SA may have sincerely been interested in their
perverted notion of a “national revolution,” the Nazi movement had
built a base and a set of alliances that was interested in something
quite different: a radical restructuring of capitalism, the end of
political democracy, and a relocation of Germany among the world’s
powers.
Right-wing populism, whether in its fascist or non-fascist form, can
assume a posture and articulate a language that can appear left-wing.
History has demonstrated this time and again. Yet right-wing populism
is NOT “right-wing + populism” but is, instead, a specific integral
phenomenon known as “right-wing populism.” It is irrationalist,
xenophobic, frequently anti-Semitic, racist and misogynistic. And it is
a movement, rather than just a few crazed individuals.
Looking at Trump and his platform tells us something but not enough. An
examination of his base and their objectives is just as important. The
white revanchism that exists among his base, i.e., the politics of
racial and imperial revenge, flows through and from the Trump campaign
like waste through a sewer. The economic anger of the Trump base is
something that is very real, but it is anger seen through a racial lens
and articulated through coded racial language.
The Trump and Cruz forces, to broaden this discussion a bit, are not
only intent on seizing the White House, but they also want to alter the
entire political landscape. The work by the Right-wing at the local and
state levels, in this regard, cannot be ignored. Efforts to promote the
conditions for a Constitutional Convention have been underway for years
by the right-wing, with a clear aim of overthrowing 20th century
victories. This corresponds with, though is independent of, plans by
candidates, such as Trump and Cruz, to eliminate various institutions,
e.g., Department of Energy, Education, that are, at least in theory, to
address broader popular needs.
For these reasons, the near exclusive focus on the individuals known as
Trump and Cruz can be misleading. What is contained in their base? What
does one make of the violence associated most especially with the Trump
campaign? Neither of these campaigns, as idiotic as they may appear,
are reality TV shows. These are spearheads of a social movement that is
very deeply rooted in the settler colonialism and racism of U.S.
society.
This brings us to the matter of the lack of a progressive electoral
strategy. It is in large part because (a) progressives are very divided
about the relative importance of electoral politics, and (b) because of
our near exclusive focus on the candidates, that there is no coherent
national progressive electoral strategy. This does not mean that people
lack ideas. There are important forces out there ranging from the
Working Families Party to the Progressive Democrats of America to more
local formations such as New Virginia Majority and New Florida Majority
that are articulating creative strategic approaches. Yet, this work is
less than the sum of its parts (with no criticism implied of these
groups). It is, however, the case that when most progressives think
about electoral politics they think less about strategy and more about
a particular candidacy or set of candidacies, more often than not
candidacies that have not emerged out of the progressive movements.
A progressive electoral strategy begins with an assumption: that
progressives are interested in not only conducting defensive battles,
but actually winning power. This is a complicated assumption because
there are many progressives who appear to not be particularly
interested in winning power unless winning power means the death of
capitalism, i.e., either capitalism dies or we sit back and criticize
the system. Such views end up reinforcing cynicism but also pessimism
about the ability to win any change. Constant defensive battles are
demoralizing and disempowering.
Even for those of us who believe in system change and social
transformation, there is a vital need for an interim approach, if only
to address the dire needs of masses of people for basic survival
(including matters relative to the environment). This need is a call
for a fight for political power, and such a fight necessitates a
strategy.
I frequently mention an experience I had in Texas about a year ago. I
gave a talk about the political situation following which there were
comments from the audience regarding the terrible political
circumstances in Texas. I listened carefully and then asked the group:
“How do we win power in Texas?” Well, the group was stunned. For many—I
could tell—my question seemed to come out of nowhere and was over the
top. Yet I went on to explain that progressives need to rethink the
manner in which we approach our situation. Texas, for instance, is
changing in many important respects, including demographically. Thus,
the question I believe that we should be asking concerns the social
movements in Texas, and which are key? I would also ask about the
politics of different cities? Further, what alliances can and must be
built? I would suggest that such questions need to be asked of every
state in the USA.
A seriousness about winning power means, to borrow from Sun-Tzu, to
know your enemy and know yourself. With respect to the fight for power,
this means that we must understand the terrain in which we are
operating; the nature of power in the USA; the nature of our enemies;
the nature of both our tactical and strategic allies; and the growth
and decline of various progressive social movements. Putting this
together helps place progressives on a road towards winning rather than
a road towards the glorious and heroic defeats with which too many of
us are familiar.
This commentary originally appeared in Alternet
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 is published every Thursday |
Executive Editor:
David A. Love, JD |
Managing Editor:
Nancy Littlefield, MBA |
Publisher:
Peter Gamble |
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